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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
DON SCOTT TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CHARLEEN TAYLOR, ) 
Defendant/Appellee ] 
) Case No. 930381-CA 
) Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended as 
this is an appeal from a final order and decree of the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County regarding a divorce 
action. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW 
1. May this Court consider on Appeal either the issue of 
the division of the Appellant's retirement account when the 
Appellant did not raise an objection to either issue below? A 
reviewing court will not consider matters on appeal which were 
not properly preserved or raised in the court below. Barson v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837-838 (Utah 1984). 
2. Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion by awarding the 
Appellee half of the contributions made to the Appellant's 
retirement account during the duration of the marriage which the 
Trial Court defined as beginning on the date of marriage and 
ending upon the date of the entry of the divorce decree? The 
standard of review is that the reviewing "court may not alter or 
reverse such a disposition unless it represents a clear abuse of 
the discretion so vested in the trial court." Pope v. Pope, 598 
P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1979) citing to Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974) and Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 
1974) . 
3. Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion by requiring 
the Appellant to pay the Appellee's attorney's fees incurred in 
defending the divorce proceeding pursuant to §30-3-3, Utah Code 
Annotated? In reviewing an award of costs in a divorce action, 
the Court of Appeals will use an abuse of discretion standard. 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991) citing 
to Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Utah App. 1990). 
4. Should this Court require the Appellant to Pay the 
Appellee's Attorney Fees incurred in Defending this Appeal 
pursuant to §30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated? This Court may award 
such attorney's fees if it finds that the evidence supports a 
finding that the Appellee has financial need, the Appellant has 
the ability to pay and the attorney's fee are reasonable. 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991). 
5. Is the Appellant's Appeal in this Case Frivolous 
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pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
entitling the Appellee to an Award of Attorneys fees and double 
Costs? This Court may find this Appeal, or any part thereof, 
Frivolous if the Appeal is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify or reverse existing law. See Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 
193, 199 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated (1993). Award of costs, 
attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, 
and in any action to establish an order of custody, 
visitation, child support, alimony or division of property 
in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the 
costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert 
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party 
to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include 
provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, 
visitation, child support, alimony or division of property 
in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney 
fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, 
may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the 
court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record 
the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a 
party to provide money, during the pendency of the action, 
for separate support and maintenance of the other party and 
of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33. Damages for delay or 
frivolous Appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court 
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these 
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as 
defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be 
paid by the party or the party's attorney. 
£ 
(b) Definitions. For purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend modify or reverse 
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief or other paper 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for 
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion brief, or 
other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any 
party or upon its own motion. A party may request 
damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's 
motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part 
of appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response 
to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the 
court, the court shall issue to the party or the 
party's attorney or both an order to show cause why 
such damages should not be awarded. The order to show 
cause shall set forth the allegations which form the 
basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in 
which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good 
cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of 
the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may 
be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are 
unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the 
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known 
to the court the action which he desires the court to take 
or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds 
therefor; and if a party has no opportunity to object to a 
ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an 
objection does not thereafter prejudice him. 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. Rule 4-504 Written 
orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written 
orders, judgments and decrees to the court. This rule is not 
intended to change existing law with respect to the 
enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts 
9 
except small claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within 
a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a 
proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to 
the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. 
Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel 
within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be 
reduced to writing and-presented to the court for signature 
within fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall 
be served upon the opposing party and proof of such services 
shall be filed with the court. All judgments, orders and 
decrees, or copies thereof, which are transmitted after signature 
by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, 
must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid 
postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments and decrees shall be prepared in 
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon the 
stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel, or upon the 
court's own initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record 
in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree 
is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and 
decrees shall contain the address or last known address of the 
judgment debtor and he social security number of the judgment 
debtor if known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate 
documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless 
otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting 
judgments or decrees may be made part of the document containing 
the stipulation or motion upon which the order is based. 
(8) No orders, judgments or decrees based upon stipulation 
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, 
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and 
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written 
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been 
rendered upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or 
plaintiff's counsel shall attach a copy of all previous judgments 
based upon the same written obligation. 
(10) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit 
the power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a 
settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not been 
reduced to writing. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. THE PARTIES 
Mr. and Mrs. Taylor were married on July 17, 1980 (Trial 
Transcript., p. 3, line 12). At the time of their marriage, Mr. 
Taylor was 43 years old and Mrs. Taylor was 49 years old. There 
were no children born as issue of this marriage. (Trial 
Transcript., p. 3, lines 22-24). 
At the time of the parties marriage, Mr. Taylor was employed 
as a United States Postal Service mailhandler and was 
continuously employed during the marriage. (Trial Transcript., 
p. 15, lines 17-20) . At the time of their marriage, Mrs. Taylor 
was employed as a secretary for Alliance Equipment Company. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 103 line 24 through p. 104 line 3). Mrs. 
Taylor ceased working for Alliance Equipment Company in 
approximately February of 1984 to resume full time duties as a 
housewife. (Trial Transcript, p. 104 line 20 through p. 105 line 
4). Mr. Taylor did not object to Mrs. Taylor's decision to 
resume duties as a full time housewife and mother to both of 
their children from prior marriages. (Trial Transcript, p. 105 
lines 5-8) . 
Mr. and Mrs. Taylor separated on New Year's Eve Day of 1984. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 106 lines 3-5). 
2. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Mr. and Mrs. Taylor were married on July 17, 1980 (Trial 
Transcript., p. 3, line 12). Mr. and Mrs. Taylor separated on 
New Year's Eve Day of 1984. (Trial Transcript, p. 106 lines 3-
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5). Sometime in either 1989 or 1990, the parties came before a 
Court Commissioner who ordered Mr. Taylor to pay Mrs. Taylor 
$400.00 per month in temporary alimony. (Trial Transcript, p. 22 
line 24 through p. 23 line 12). 
Mr. Taylor filed for divorce on December 6, 1990. Mrs. 
Taylor filed an answer on January 15, 1991. Additionally, Mrs. 
Taylor filed a Motion for Order on Temporary Matters on January 
15, 1991. Discovery commenced in January of 1991 and proceeded 
through October of 1992. Trial was scheduled for and held on 
November 2, 1992. Following the trial, the Court made a ruling 
granting the divorce based on irreconcilable differences. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 161 lines 6-12) . The court made findings as to 
both premarital property and an equitable distribution of marital 
property. (Trial Transcript, p. 161 line 13 through p. 162 line 
11). Additionally, the Court made a ruling awarding both alimony 
and attorney's fees to Mrs. Taylor. (Trial Transcript, p. 162 
line 12 through p. 163 line 1). Mrs. Taylor's attorney was 
requested to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
consistent with the Court's ruling. (Trial Transcript, p. 163 
lines 5-8). 
Mr. Tycksen, counsel for Mrs. Taylor, prepared Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law which were submitted to Mr. Taylor's 
attorney prior to submission to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-504 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Counsel for Mr. 
Taylor filed objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on December 16, 1992. Oral Argument was heard on April 5, 
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1993 regarding Mr. Taylor's objections to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. On April 7, 1993, the Court made a 
minute entry ruling on Mr. Taylor's objections to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. On May 4, 1993, Judge Noel executed 
the revised Divorce Decree and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. An appeal was thereafter filed by Mr, 
Taylor. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This court may not address the issue of the Trial Court's 
division of Mr. Taylor's retirement account because counsel for 
Mr. Taylor failed to preserve this error by raising an objection 
below. This Court will not consider matters which have not been 
properly preserved through objection below. 
Assuming arguendo that Counsel for Mr. Taylor did properly 
object below, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's 
discretion with respect to the division of Mr. Taylor's 
retirement account. Specifically, the Trial Court followed Utah 
law by valuing the retirement account on the date of the entry of 
divorce. Further, there was no evidence that Mrs. Taylor 
dissipated any assets or in any manner acted obstructively which 
would have permitted the Trial Court to value the marital assets 
at a time other than the date of the entry of the divorce decree. 
There being no clear abuse of discretion, this Court should 
affirm the Trial Court's ruling on the division of Mr. Taylor's 
retirement account. 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
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Mrs. Taylor attorney's fees. The Trial Court heard substantial 
evidence on Mrs. Taylor's need, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay and 
on the reasonableness of the fees incurred. Because the Trial 
Court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the award of 
Attorney's fees, this Court must affirm the Trial Court's ruling 
on this issue. 
Mrs. Taylor is entitled to attorney's fees incurred in 
defending this appeal. The lower court established Mrs. Taylor's 
need, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay and the reasonableness of the 
fees incurred. In Utah, where a party to a divorce action is 
awarded attorney's fees at the trial level, such fees are also 
awarded on appeal pursuant to §30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 
(1993) . Thus, this Court should award Mrs. Taylor attorney fees 
incurred on this appeal. 
This court should award Mrs. Taylor both attorney fees and 
double costs on this appeal because Mr. Taylor's appeal is 
frivolous pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This appeal is frivolous because it is not well 
grounded in either fact or law nor is there a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification or reversal of current law. 
Thus, because this appeal is frivolous pursuant to Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court should award Mrs. 
Taylor all of her attorneys fees and double costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DISREGARD THE APPELLANT'S APPEAL ON THE 
ISSUE OF THE DIVISION OF HIS RETIREMENT ACCOUNT BECAUSE THE 
APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THIS AS ERROR BY OBJECTING 
BELOW. 
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This court should disregard the Appellant's appeal on the 
issue of the division of his retirement account because the 
Appellant failed to preserve this issue as error by objecting 
below. It is a well established principle of Utah law that a 
reviewing court will not address matters on appeal which were not 
properly preserved by objection below. In State v. Ortiz, 118 
Utah Adv. Rep. 75, 76 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court said, "a 
contemporaneous or some form of specific preservation of claims 
of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an 
appellate court will review such a claim on appeal." See also 
Brobera v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989); Lopez v. 
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986); and Barson v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984) . Thus, if 
Appellant did not object below, this Court may not consider the 
issue of the division of his retirement account on appeal. 
There is nothing in the record which indicates that the 
Appellant objected to the Trial Court's determination that the 
contributions paid into Appellant's retirement account should be 
divided equally between the parties. "The Burden is always on 
the party objecting to make,certain that the record adequately 
preserves an objection or argument for review in the event of an 
appeal." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 837 
(Utah 1984). The appellant had the opportunity to object to the 
Court's characterization of the marriage as still in effect until 
the divorce was granted. (Trial Transcript, p. 134 lines 6-21) . 
Additionally, the Appellant objected to the Court's Findings of 
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Fact and Conclusions of Law without objecting to the Court's 
ruling on the division of the Appellant's retirement account. 
See Plaintiff's Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions o: 
Law attached hereto as Appendix 1. Thus, because the Appellant 
failed to carry his burden of insuring that the record reflected 
his objection, this Court should not address this issue on 
appeal. 
Mrs. Taylor recognizes that a formal exception or objection 
is no longer required to preserve errors under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 46 states 
Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are 
unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the 
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known 
to the court the action which he desires the court to take 
or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds 
therefor; and if a party has no opportunity to object to a 
ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an 
objection does not thereafter prejudice him. 
However, the fact that Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure does not require a formal objection, does not abrogate 
that Appellant's obligation to make some form of statement which 
puts the Trial Court on notice that the Appellant disagrees with 
the ruling or order. In Brobercr v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah 
App. 1989), at footnote 2, this court said 
Although Utah R. Civ. P. 46 provides that a "formal" 
exception to a ruling is not required, the rule does not 
excuse the necessity to record any objection or exception at 
all. 
Thus, Appellant had the obligation to make his exception to the 
Trial Court's ruling known to the Trial Court so that the Trial 
Court had the opportunity to rule on the objection. Having 
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failed to so notify the court or preserve his objection in any 
other way, the Appellant should not be permitted to raise this 
issue on appeal. Therefore, the Appellee requests this Court 
rule that the Appellant is not entitled to review on the issue of 
the division of his retirement benefits. 
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT MR. TAYLOR DID PRESERVE HIS 
OBJECTION BELOW, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY AWARDING MRS. TAYLOR FIFTY PERCENT OF THE 
CONTRIBUTIONS MADE TO THAT ACCOUNT DURING THE TWELVE YEAR 
COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE. 
In this case, there is nothing inequitable nor was it an 
abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to determine that Mrs. 
Taylor was entitled to share one half of Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal 
Service Retirement Account commencing with the date of the 
parties' marriage and terminating on the date that the Decree of 
Divorce was signed, which was May 4, 1993. 
TIME USED TO VALUE AND DIVIDE MARITAL PROPERTY 
For purposes of equitable distribution, marital property is 
valued at the time of trial. This is a well settled principle of 
Utah law. In Proudfit v. Proudfit. 598 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 
1979), the Utah Supreme Court said 
Under Utah divorce law, the trial court is empowered to make 
such disposition of property between the parties as is 
equitable. As [sic] reviewing court may not alter or 
reverse such a disposition unless it represents a clear 
abuse of discretion so vested in the trial court. 
Proudfit at 1319 citing to Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 
(Utah 1974) and Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). 
Thus, the Appellant has the burden on appeal to show that such an 
abuse of discretion occurred. Because the Appellant has failed 
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to show such an abuse of discretion, this Court must affirm the 
ruling of the Trial Court. 
The Trial Court properly valued Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal 
Service Retirement Account on the date of the Decree of Divorce. 
In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980), the 
court said, "the marital estate is evaluated according to the 
existing property interests at the time the marriage is 
terminated by decree of the court." Fletcher at 1222 citing to 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977) and Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). This rule of valuing 
property at the time of the entry of the divorce decree is well 
entrenched in Utah law. See also Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 
697 (Utah 1985); Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1051 (Utah App. 
1987); Anderson v. Anderson, 757 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah App. 1988); 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App. 1990); Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). In fact, as 
recently as four months prior to Mr. Taylor filing his appeal, 
this Court reiterated the rule that marital property should be 
valued at the time of the entry of the divorce decree. See 
Hoagland v. Hoagland, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 26 (Utah App. 1993). 
Mr. Taylor correctly asserts that the general rule of 
valuing marital property at the date of entry of the Decree of 
Divorce is not without exceptions. In Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 
(Utah App. 1987), this Court explained the circumstances under 
which the trial court may exercise its discretion to value the 
marital estate at some time other than the date of the entry of 
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the decree of divorce. In Peck, this Court said, 
where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, 
or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, under 
its broad discretion, value the property at an earlier date, 
i.e. separation. 
Peck at 1052, citing to In re Marriage of Priddis, 132 Cal App. 
3d 349, 183 Cal. Rptr. 37, 39 (1982) and In re Marriage of 
Stallcup. 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 158 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1979) 
[emphasis added]. In Peck, the trial court valued the 
Defendant's business at the time of separation rather than at the 
time of the entry of the divorce decree. The Defendant in Peck 
acted obstructively by closing the corporations accounts and 
ceasing all business recording keeping at the time the parties 
separated. Therefore, the trial court exercised its discretion 
to value the marital property at a time other than the date of 
the entry of the divorce decree because the Defendant acted 
obstructively. 
In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991), the 
trial court valued the parties standard of living at the time of 
separation. However, following the separation, the Plaintiff's 
income doubled as a result of a corporate take over of his 
employer's business. On appeal, this court remanded the case for 
the trial court to base alimony on the standard of living at the 
time of the entry of the divorce decree. In Howell, neither of 
the parties acted obstructively, dissipated or otherwise 
attempted to hide any assets. 
In the present case, there is no evidence that either party 
acted obstructively/ dissipated or attempted to hide any assets. 
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In fact, Mr. Taylor asserts only that the Trial Court abused its 
discretion because the parties were separated for a substantial 
period of time before Mr. Taylor filed for divorce and that the 
parties ceased to function as a marital unit when the parties 
separated. 
Mr. Taylor could have filed for divorce at any time he so 
chose. He did not do so for many years following the separation. 
There is no evidence in the record as to why Mr. Taylor waited so 
long to file for divorce. This Court should not attempt to infer 
reasons for Mr. Taylor's conduct when there is not evidence from 
which to draw such inferences. The fact that the parties were 
separated for a long period of time before Mr. Taylor filed for 
divorce was completely within the control of Mr. Taylor. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by valuing the property 
at the time of the entry of the divorce decree when there was no 
evidence of obstruction, dissipation or otherwise attempting to 
hide assets. 
Mr. Taylor also asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion in valuing the property at the time of the entry of 
the divorce decree because the parties ceased functioning as a 
marital unit when they separated. In making this argument, Mr. 
Taylor relies on Hoagland v. Hoagland, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 26 
(Utah App. 1993) . In Hoagland, the had been experiencing both 
marital and financial troubles when the husband-Defendant 
attempted to improve their respective standard of living by 
taking a job in Nevada. After securing employment and purchasing 
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a home, he invited his wife-Plaintiff to join him in Nevada. She 
declined and filed for divorce. 
The trial court in Hoacrland ruled that the standard of 
living for purposes of alimony was that standard of living 
existing at the time of separation not at the time of divorce. 
On review, this Court said, 
Here the court found that Wife has not become accustomed to 
a high standard of living during the marriage . . . . Here, 
Wife did not want-to move from her home in Utah to continue 
the marriage, yet she wanted to benefit from the higher 
standard of living, obtained in part, as a result of 
Husband's relocation. Moreover, the court found that the 
marriage essentially ended when Husband moved out of Utah. 
Hoacrland at 26. 
The present case is distinguishable from Hoaaland. First, 
in Hoaaland, it was the Plaintiff-Wife who did not want to 
continue the marriage, yet wanted the benefit of the higher 
standard of living. In the present case, it was Mr. Taylor who 
did not want to continue the marriage. (Trial Transcript, p. 106 
lines 3-5). It was Mr. Taylor who did not immediately file for 
divorce. And it is now Mr. Taylor who wishes to reduce the award 
the Trial Court, in the proper exercise of its discretion, 
granted to Mrs. Taylor. Thus, the present case is factually 
distinguishable from Hoaaland. 
Mr. Taylor wishes this Court to interpret Hoaaland as 
standing for the proposition that a the date of valuation of 
marital property should be the date upon which the marriage 
essentially ended. Such an interpretation is inherently fraught 
with future problems for the judiciary. All marriages that end 
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in divorce essentially end as functioning marriages long before 
the separation occurs. 
This Court should not adopt a standard of valuing property 
at the time the marriage ceases to function as such. The logical 
result of such a standard will be parties seeking to value 
property prior to the date of separation. Every party to a 
divorce will tell a woeful tale of how the marriage ceased to 
function as a marriage-months and even years before the parties 
physically separated. 
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion with 
respect to the division of Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal Service 
Retirement Account because it was following controlling Utah 
precedent. In Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the very issue which is 
before this Court today. In Alexander, the "Plaintiff argue[d] 
that contributions he made to the profit-sharing plan after the 
defendant left the marital home but before the marriage was 
terminated should not be included in the marital estate." The 
Utah Supreme Court's definitive response to this argument in a 
published two word opinion was "We disagree." Alexander at 224. 
The trial court properly followed precedent and did not abuse its 
discretion in the manner in which it chose to divide the 
Plaintiff's retirement account. 
In the present case, the Trial Court properly exercised its 
discretion in dividing Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal Service 
Retirement Account. The record contains no evidence that Mrs. 
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Taylor acted obstructively, dissipated or otherwise attempted to 
hide assets. Mr. Taylor was the party who wished to end the 
marriage. Yet Mr. Taylor did not file this action until six 
years after he left Mrs. Taylor. The Trial Court did not abuse 
its discretion. Therefore, this Court should affirm the Trial 
Court's ruling on the disposition of Mr. Taylor's U.S. Postal 
Service Retirement Account. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
ORDERED MR, TAYLOR TO PAY MRS. TAYLOR'S ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS PURSUANT TO §30-3-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mr. 
Taylor to pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by Mrs. Taylor 
in defending this action pursuant to §30-3-3, U.C.A. (1993). The 
trial court based this ruling on substantial evidence of Mrs. 
Taylor's need, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay and the reasonableness 
of the fees incurred. Because the Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion, this Court must affirm the Trial Court's award of 
attorney fees and costs to Mrs. Taylor. 
Section 30-3-3(1) permits the Trial Court to award either 
party costs, attorney and witness fees. Section 30-3-3(1) states 
In any action . . . to establish an order of custody, 
visitation, child support, alimony or division of property 
in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the 
costs, attorney fees and witness fees, including expert 
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party 
to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include 
provision for costs of the action. 
§30-3-3(1), U.C.A. (1993). The cases interpreting this section 
have universally stated that the trial court is vested with great 
discretion as to awarding costs and attorney fees to either 
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party.1 Before awarding attorneys fees to any party, the trial 
court must find the financial need of the spouse receiving 
support, the ability to pay of the other spouse and the 
reasonableness of the fees incurred. See e.g. Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992) citing to Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 
P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988); and Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 
83, 89 (Utah App. 1987)-. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding to Mrs. Taylor her costs and attorney fees 
because there was ample evidence of her need as the spouse 
receiving support, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the fees incurred. 
The record clearly establishes that Mrs. Taylor is in 
financial need. The trial court had before it Mrs. Taylor's 
Financial Declaration (attached hereto as Appendix 2) which 
stated that Mrs. Taylor's expenses exceeded her income by 
$397.65. Additionally, the trial court heard testimony as to 
Mrs. Taylor's income (Trial Transcript, p.112, line 4; p. 112 
lines 14-16; p. 112 lines 23-25; p. 147 lines 7-25; and p. 150 
lines 15-18) and expenses (Trial Transcript, p. 126 line 22 
through p. 127 line 22; p. 147 lines 7-25; p. 148 lines 17-24; p. 
150 line 3-7 and lines 18-21). This testimony revealed that at 
1
 See Burtt v. Burtt, 204 P. 91, 94 (Utah 1922); Weiss v. 
Weiss, 179 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Utah 1947); Walther v. Walther. 709 
P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985); Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 
(Utah App. 1989); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah App. 
1990); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991); Crouse v. 
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991) ;and Peterson v. 
Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991). 
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the time of trial Mrs. Taylor's expenses exceeded her income by 
approximately $500.00. (Trial Transcript p. 150 lines 18-21). 
Thus, the trial court had ample evidence of Mrs. Taylor's need. 
The trial court found that Mr. Taylor had the ability to 
pay. The record contained more than sufficient evidence for the 
trial court to make this determination. The record contained two 
financial declarations made by Mr. Taylor. The first, executed 
on March 8, 1991 (attached hereto as Appendix 3) indicated that 
Mr. Taylor's income exceeded his expenses by $851.08. The 
second, executed on October 30, 1992 (attached hereto as Appendix 
4) indicated that Mr. Taylor's income exceeded his expenses by 
$216.33. Included in Mr. Taylor's monthly expenses in this 
latter financial declaration was the earlier award of $400.00 in 
temporary alimony. In addition to Mr. Taylor's financial 
declarations, the trial court heard testimony as to Mr. Taylor's 
income (Trial Transcript, p. 15 lines 17-24; p. 47 lines 8-11; p. 
71 lines 7-21; p. 72 lines 21-25 and p. 73 line 12 through p. 74 
line 1) and expenses (Trial Transcript, p. 18 line 23 through p. 
19 line 19; p. 21 lines 5-24; p. 22 lines 2-22; p. 23 lines 8-12; 
p. 69 line 21 through p. 71 line 3; p. 95 lines 20-25; p. 98 
lines 13-23; p. 99 lines 10-13; and p. 101 line 3-21). This 
testimony revealed that Mr. Taylor's income approximately 
exceeded his expenses by $500.00 per month. (Trial Transcript, 
p. 47 lines 8-11). Thus, the trial court had more than enough 
factual information upon which to determine that Mr. Taylor had 
the ability to pay Mrs. Taylor's attorney fees and costs. 
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The record contained sufficient information for the trial 
court to determine that the fees incurred by Mrs. Taylor in 
defending this action were reasonable. The trial court heard 
testimony that Mrs. Taylor paid her first attorney $1,489.50 who 
withdrew from this action. (Trial Transcript, p. 158 line 24 
through p. 159 line 1). Mrs. Taylor's present counsel submitted 
into evidence an affidavit stating the amount of fees he had 
charged in this action.- Mr. Taylor's attorney did not object to 
the admission of this affidavit. (Trial Transcript, p. 158 lines 
13-23) . The trial court heard testimony that Mrs. Taylor spent 
$2,122.61 in preparation for trial and approximately $1,125.00 in 
trial time and estimated post-trial completion work. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 159 lines 2-8). Mrs. Taylor's counsel then made a 
proffer which stated that he was licensed to practice in Utah, 
worked diligently on this case, bills $125 per hour and that in 
light of his years of experience and the necessity for the hours 
incurred, such fees were reasonable. Mr. Taylor's counsel 
accepted the proffer without objection (Trial Transcript, p. 160 
lines 4-12) . Thus, the trial court had ample evidence in the 
record to determine the reasonableness of the attorney fees 
incurred. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring 
Mr. Taylor to pay the costs and attorney fees incurred by Mrs. 
Taylor in defending this action. The record contained ample 
evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mrs. Taylor 
had financial need, that Mr. Taylor had the ability to pay and 
2£ 
that the fees incurred were reasonable. Based on the foregoing, 
this Court must affirm the trial court's ruling on attorney fees 
and costs. 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD MRS. TAYLOR HER COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES IN DEFENDING THIS APPEAL. 
It is a well settled principle of Utah law that the 
provisions of Section 30-3-3 applies to attorney fees and costs 
on appeal. See Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 162-63 (Utah 
App. 1989); See also Ostler v. Ostler, 798 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 
App. 1990). Moreover, in Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 840 
(Utah App. 1991), this Court said 
Ordinarily when fees in a divorce have been awarded below to 
the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be 
awarded to that party on appeal. 
Crouse at 840 quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489. 494 (Utah App. 
1991) quoting Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d, 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 
1990) . Finally, it is not necessary for the party to prevail on 
appeal in order to award costs and fees pursuant to Section 30-3-
3(1), U.C.A. (1993). See Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 427 
(Utah App. 1990) citing to Ostler v. Ostler, 798 P.2d 713, 717 
(Utah App. 1990) . 
In the present case, this Court should award Mrs. Taylor 
attorneys fees and costs in defending this appeal regardless of 
whether or not she prevails. The record below strongly indicates 
Mrs. Taylor's need, Mr. Taylor's ability to pay and the 
reasonableness of the fees incurred. The trial court found that 
Mrs. Taylor was entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs 
in the action below. It is the general rule in this jurisdiction 
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that such a party is also entitled to costs and attorney fees on 
appeal. While prevailing is not necessary, the rule is 
especially true where the party receiving the support prevails on 
the appeal. Thus, this Court should award Mrs. Taylor the costs 
and attorney's fees for defending this appeal. 
V. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND MR. TAYLORS APPEAL FRIVOLOUS AND 
AWARD MRS. TAYLOR ATTORNEY FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS PURSUANT TO 
RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states 
Damages for delay or frivolous Appeal; recovery of 
attorney7s fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court 
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these 
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as 
defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be 
paid by the party or the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend modify or reverse 
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief or other paper 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for 
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion brief, or 
other paper. 
Rule 33(a) & (b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1993). 
This appeal is frivolous as defined in Rule 33(b) because it 
is not well grounded in fact. First, Mr. Taylor's claims are not 
well grounded in fact. An example of such baseless factual 
claims is, in addressing the issue of Mrs. Taylor's need for 
attorneys fees. Mr. Taylor's brief says 
The only manner in which Defendant addressed this issue at 
trial was as follows: Defendant's Counsel asked Defendant, 
xNow are your asking for some contribution from Mr. Taylor 
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to help you with attorney's fees?' Defendant responds, 
xYes.' (Tr., p. 159) 
See Appellant's Brief, p. 15. Factually, the record contains a 
significant amount of testimony and other evidence as to Mrs. 
Taylor's need. See Argument III. Thus, Mr. Taylor's appeal is 
not well grounded in fact. 
Mr. Taylor's appeal is frivolous because it is not well 
grounded in law. The law is deeply entrenched with respect to 
the issues presented. Additionally, Mr. Taylor fails to fully 
apprise this Court of the law relevant to each issue presented. 
For instance, while Mr. Taylor admits that the general rule is to 
value property at the time of the entry of the divorce decree, he 
urges this court to recognize the need for exceptions to this 
rule. However, Mr. Taylor fails to point out that this court has 
already ruled on when and what exceptions apply to this rule such 
as when one of the parties has behaved obstructively or has 
either hidden or dissipated assets. Moreover, he fails to argue 
why the exception he seeks should be added to the existing rule 
and with respect to this same issue, he fails to point to the one 
contrary case in this jurisdiction which is on all fours 
factually with this case. Mr. Taylor fails to inform this Court 
that the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that it is not an abuse of 
discretion to include as part of the marital estate those 
contributions made to a profit sharing plan after the parties 
separated but before the marriage was legally terminated. Thus. 
Mr. Taylor's brief is not well grounded in law. 
Mr. Taylor's brief is frivolous because it is not based on a 
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good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. 
Mr. Taylor's arguments addressing the question of attorney fees 
fails to fully develop the factual record. Upon a careful look 
at the record, it is clear that the trial court had sufficient 
evidence before it to establish Mrs. Taylor's need, Mr. Taylor's 
ability to pay and the reasonableness of the fees incurred. On 
the issue of attorney fees, Mr. Taylor does not have a good faith 
argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. 
Mr. Taylor does not have a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law with respect 
to the issue of the retirement account. Mr. Taylor's arguments 
in this section amount to little more than a plea to this court 
to find that his retirement account fits into one of the narrow 
exceptions which will permit him to hold on to a greater 
percentage of the money the trial court found, based on competent 
evidence and the precedent of Utah law, to be marital assets. 
Mr. Taylor's appeal is frivolous pursuant to Rule 33(a) and 
(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Rule 33(a), 
this court has the power to sanction a party who files a 
frivolous appeal by awarding the defending party double costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. Because this appeal is frivolous, 
Mrs. Taylor asks this Court to sanction Mr. Taylor by awarding 
her double costs and attorney's fees on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should not consider Mr. Taylor's claims 
concerning the disposition of his retirement account because Mr. 
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Taylor failed to object to this disposition in any way. Assuming 
arguendo that such an objection is no longer necessary, this 
Court should affirm the trial court's disposition of this account 
because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by valuing 
the account as of the date of the entry of the divorce decree. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
costs and attorney fees to Mrs. Taylor pursuant to §30-3-3, 
U.C.A. (1993) . The evidence clearly establishes that Mrs, Taylor 
has need, Mr. Taylor has the ability to pay and that the fees 
incurred were reasonable. Thus, this court should affirm the 
trial court's grant of attorney fees to Mrs. Taylor. Because of 
the foregoing, this Court should grant costs and attorney fees 
incurred in defending this appeal to Mrs. Taylor. 
This Court should rule that Mr. Taylor's appeal is 
frivolous. Mr. Taylor's appeal is not well grounded in fact or 
law. Mr. Taylor does not have a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
this Court should award Mrs. Taylor double costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
DATED this I day of Q£ft>&&Z-- , 1993 
<U-
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Appellee 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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David Paul White 
7434 South State Street, #102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
4_ day of Dtm*-on this "V day of L^L^^-*— , 1993 
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DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441) 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
7434 SOUTH STATE STREET, #102 
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 
TELEPHONE: (801) 566-8188 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON SCOTT TAYLOR, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
CHARLEEN TAYLOR, ' 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF 
I FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 904904902 DA 
i Judge Franlc G. Noel 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD HEREIN: 
Notice is hereby given that the Plaintiff objects to the 
purported Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as drafted and 
served by you on December 4, 1992 for the following reason: 
1. The Findings and Decree should indicate that David Paul 
White represents Mr. Taylor. 
2. Paragraph 8 of the Findings refer to Ms. Taylor being debt 
free at the time of the parties1 marriage. This reference should 
be removed as there was no evidence at trial to support such a 
finding. 
3. Paragraph 9 of the Findings should indicate that the 
Defendant quit her employ in 1982 and remained at home to take care 
of Plaintiff's and her own children. 
4. Paragraph 12 should indicate that the parties have had no 
contact since the separation in 1984. 
5. Paragraph 15 should omit the reference that Defendant 
expended any of her savings funas on marital debts. There was no 
evidence presented at trial to support that finding. 
6. An additional paragraph should be added to the Findings to 
specify the parties lack of social and financial contact during the 
separation period• 
7. Paragraph 11 of the Conclusions states that Defendant has 
need of attorney's fees^ No evidence was presented as to need, nor 
was there a finding of need, merely Defendant's counsel's affidavit 
as to attorney's fees. 
DATED this //# U\ . day December, 1992. 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Steven C. TycJcsen 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorney for Defendant 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
DATED this ll/rtl day of December, 1992. 
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In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON SCOTT TAYLOR 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
CHARLEEN AYLOR 
Defendant 
Husband: 
Address: 
Soc. Sec. No. 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Birthdate: 
Case No. 904904902 DA 
Financial Declaration 
Dated: 
Wife: Charleen E l i zabe th Taylor 
Address: 2128 Kayland Way 
S a l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84117 
Soc. Sec. No.: 539-26-1112 
Occupation: Recep t i on i s t 
Employer: 
Birthdate: 
In termountain Health Care 
7-30-31 
NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE. PRESENT. AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL 
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR 
ITS DECISION. 
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR 
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and de-
ductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures arcpn a bi-weekly 
basis, multiply by 2.167) 
1. Gross monthly income from: 
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses. 
allowances and overtime, payable (pay 
period) 
Pensions and retirement. 
Social security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare. AFDC payments, etc.). 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividends and interest 
Rents 
All other sources: (Specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME . 
2. Itemize monthly deductions from gross income: 
State and federal income taxes 
Number of exemptions taken 
Social security 
Medical or other insurance (describe fullv). 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund 
Savings plan 
Credit union 
| HUSBAND 
3 
s 
s 
WIFE | 
$ 
L, 16&J57 
• 
s 
s 
1,168.6? 1 
188-.79" J 
l 
" 89.41 
Other (specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS. 
3. Net monthly income - take home pay 
r |$ 
$278*20 
$890.47 1 
4. Debts and obligations: 
Creditor's Name For Date Payable Balance Monthly Payment 
Sea r s RoebucR Lawrilnower, c l o t h e s 
Mastercard Clo thes / misc . 
Mervyn's Clo thes 
A t t o r n e y f s fees 
TOTAL 
2HEH 
zna 
232-42 
lb t i .01 
b^.iy 
var ies -
S 70 .^p 
T07UO [ 
2b.UU J 
ib .UU J 
sido.oo I 
$lbU.UU J 
(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule) 
5. All property of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband. (Wl Wife. 
(J) Jointly). 
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR USTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE. 
Value Owed Thereon 
(a) Household furnishings, furniture, 
appliances and equipment 
lb) Automobile (Year-Make) 1978 C h e v r o l e t 
S 
850.00 
50.00 
S 1 
(c) Securities - stocks, bonds 
* (d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans, 
credit unions - savings and checking) 
ttfest One Checkina Account 315.00 
(e) Life Insurance: 
Name of Company 
None 
Cash value, accumulated 
Policy No. Face Amount dividend, or loan amount 
$ S 
(i) Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts 
Name NOELS 
Name _, 
Value of interest and amount presently vested 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify) 
None 
(h) Real Estate (Where more than one pared of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional properrv) 
AHH^. 2128 Kayland Wa^  TVoeofiWrtv Residential '_ 
21,300 Original Cost S . 
Cost of Additions S . 
Total Cost S 
Mtg. Balance S 
Other Liens S 
Equity S 
Type of Property 
Date of AcouisitioT" A u g u s t , lSffiT 
Total Present Value $ 1 0 2 , 0 0 0 
Basis of Valuation , 
evaluation" 
S.L. County Prop, tax 
Monthly Amortization S . 
Taxes $ 1 , 2 2 8 . 3 1 
And to whom 
Individual contributions 
(i) Business interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness). 
N o n e 
(j) Other assets (Specify) 
Montana property 
6. Total monthly expenses: '(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of ail members of the 
household whose expenses are included.) 
HUSBAND WIFE 
S 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence). 
Real property taxes (residence) 
Real property insurance (residence), 
Maintenance (residence) 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat_ 
Telephone 
Laundry and cleaning. 
Clothing 
Medical 
Dental , 
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liability, disability) Exclude Payroll Deducted 
Child care 
106.00 
'22.U0 
37TUDT 
166.00 
30. GO 
20.00 
101.60 
33.00 
16.00 
Payment of child spousal support re prior marriage . 
School 
! 
Entertainment (includes, clubs, social obligations, travel recreation) 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco. alcohoL gifts, and donations) 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Auto payments _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule 
if not fully set forth in id) on the ilrst page hereoti
 m 
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) n e w s p a p e r 
TOTAL EXPENSES 
5,37 
55.00 
25.00 
12b:. 00 
200.00 Iestft 
15Q*00 
8.24 
S 
1,365.04 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of . 19 
Notary Public residing in Salt Lake County. Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION. INCLUDING 
BUT NOT LIMITED TO. PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS. 3 MOST RECENT TAX 
RETURNS. CREDITUNION SHARE STATEMENTS. PASSBOOKS. CHECKBOOKS. CANCELLED CHECKS, 
CERTIFICATES. POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
APPENDIX 3 
25 
In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
Don Taylor 
Plaintiff 
^ d £ase No. 904904902 DA 
vs. 
Charleen T a v l o r 
Defendant 
Financial Declaration 
Dated: 
Husband: Firm T a y l mr 
Address: 2598 V a l l e y View Ave. 
Holladay, Utah 
Wife: _ 
Address: 
Soc. Sec. No.. §29-48-9791 
Occupation: 
Employer: ^ * ^ 
Birthdate: 
Letter Carrier 
Postal Service 
04-07-37 
Soc. Sec. No.. 
Occupation: . 
Employer: 
Birthdate: 
NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE. PRESENT. AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED 
WILL AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE 
BASIS FOR ITS DECISION. 
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALLSUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR PERJURY 
AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(NOTE: To arrive at aKMMfeiy figures wheal tecum* i* received ami deduction* are 
• weekly, UNiitipJy by 4*3; If figures are ou a bi-weeaiy basis, nuiiiJpiy by 2.1*7) 
Gross monthly income from: 
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses. 
allowances and overtime, payable «•«•••——•-—— 
period) .«_»_«»__-_____--__--_-_---—-——_—_ 
ip»y 
Pensions and retirement 
Social security _ _ _ 
Disability and unemployment insurance _ _ 
Public assistance (welfare. AFDC payments, etc.) 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividends and interest
 M _ M M M M M M M 
Rents 
Sale of Montana Prop 
All other sources. (Specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME 
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income: 
State ami federal income taxes _ _ _ _ _ 
Number of exemptions taken — - _ — _ _ _ 
Social security «M M M_M_M.W M.M M M_W M.M M-- . 
Medical or other insurance (describe fully) 
Union or other dues _ _ . 
Retirement or pension fund 
Savings plan — — _ _ _ 
Credit union - • » • « — _ _ 
j HUSBAND 
S 
2.768 
151.31 
$ 2 , 9 1 9 . 3 1 
s 
1 614.45 
2 
19.37 
41.06 
12.22 
1 fiq 701 
] WIFE | 
S 
( j 
S 
s 
J. 
1 
Other (specify) S e r i e s E B o n d s 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
J. Net monthly income 'take home pav _ _ _ 
Jb.M 
$ 932.63 
S l , 9 8 6 . 6 8 
s 
s 
4 Debts and obligation*. 
Creditor's Name For Date Payable Balance Monthly Payment 
Kathe r ine Thomas 
Visa 
TOTAL 
| 14,Ufa').bb | 
ZbU 
^4 ,320 .65 
i—5 r m 1 
$
 600 1 
(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule) 
5. All property of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband. (W) Wife. (J) Jointly) 
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE 
Value Owed Thereon 
(a) Household furnishings, furniture, 
appliances, and equipment _ . 
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) _ _ 1982 Toyota 1973 Pord— 
500 
2, UUU 
40'J 
(C) Securities - stock*, bond* 
Dean Witter Money market 57.82 
jms_ 1.529.53 
Lnrri Ahhott Bond Deb 2886.37 
TVan Wirrpir U t i l i t y Fund 2488.05 
r i o a n U i f t - g - r T n r T n r S&C. 13453,51 
AfrPi afpri Eunr 
• # & & • (d) Cah^Jno^DcpdjPYctouraiYSank*. savings 4 Io«in*. 
credit unions - savings and checking) 
XJ^«5f OTIP 
T?-i-rct- .qfflt-P Rpnk o f M o n t a n a 
/\nmrri C.ir&Ai t" TTm* on 
730™ 
750 
1600 
(e| Life Insurance: 
Name of Company Policy No. 
Group Life Post "Office 
Face Amount 
Cash value, accumulated 
dividend, or loan amount 
(0 Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts 
Name
 M M M M M M M - a n M H M M M W M M M _ - M 
32,000 "TO" 
Value of interest and amount presently vested 
Name United States Civil Service $27,280.31 
(gj Other Personal Property and Assets Specify) 
Addrcu ?lt. Haven Big CottdnwoocT^ 
s a l t Laek County, Lot ZUb, ZU7 
Original Cost $ 3 , ( 1 0 0 
,..«.« wwii ioew ,ai ' t f t f j M i ^ ^ ^ i j ^ t t i o n a l propenyl 
Type oi Property 
Date of Acquisi t ion X?72 
Cost of Additions S 7 , 0 0 0 
Total Cost X 1 5 . 0 0 0 
Mig Balance % _ 
Other l.iens S 
Equity S _ « « _ 
Total Present Value S 2 6 . 0 0 0 
Basis of Valuation county value 
0 
Monthly Amortization S _ _ _ _ 
laxcsS ^fifl p n r t n a l 
And to whom 
Individual contributions 
(i) Business interest (Indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness! 
NONE 
(!) Other assets (Specify) 
NONE 
Total monthly expenses. •(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of alt members of the household whose 
expenses are included.) 
» Two sons , over 21, l i v i n g a t home HUSBAND WIFE 
•wr Rem or mortgage payments (residence) 
Real property taxes (residence) _ _ 
Real property insurance (residence) _ 
Maintenance (residence) _ _ _ _ _ 
Food and household supplies - _ _ _ — • 
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat 
Telephone „ 
Laundry and cleaning 
Clothing _ _ _ _ 
Medical 
Dental 
~lo~ 
450 
10 
20 
Insurance (lile. health, accident, comprehensive Iiabilttv. 
disability| Exclude Payroll Deducted _ _ _ _ _ 
Child care — 
Payment ol child tpousal support re prior marriage _ 
School • 
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation). 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations) _ 
Transportation (other than automobile) , _ _ _ « _ _ - - _ — - - _ - _ 
Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance) • 
Auto payments —-----——-—--—-——----------——--——— 
Installment payment* s). (Insert total and attach itemued schedule 
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof) 
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) 
JUL 
30-
50 
_50_ 
1Q£L 
TOTAL EXPENSES 
1 ,135.00 
Address P o t t e r Lane 
,~-ww _ .«• | r««*%l «## I C « I owncQ. a m e n sheet with identical information fpr all additionaUiroperty) 
A^riculxuraT -
Heber. Utah 
Original Cost S - 26.QQQ 
Type of Property — 
Oate of Acquisition TTTT 20,790 
l . Q Q Q Cost of Additions S 
Total Cost S 2 7 , Q Q Q 
Mtg Balance $ 
Other \.»<n% S _ 
Equity S 
Total Present Value $ -
iumofv,.„,„o« Offered t h i s p r i c e 
0 
JL 
1/3 7,?63 
Monthly Amortt/atiun S _ _ _ _ 
ia«cs$ —276,40 annual 
And to whom 
Individual contribution* 
, . „ , ~ ™ » ..*».* Mt*irw4* oaccei ot real estate owned, attach sheet with identical ,n'wWW^(<?<t4tt34^fJOIMI' projxnyj 
Address 1 3 7 5 7 S o u t h R e d W Q O d j y p c Qf pf0pefiy . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ « « 
Date of Acquisition _ 1984 
Onpn*! COM S 1 0 5 , 0 0 0 loial Pr«em V»iu« I 9 * 7 , 0 0 0 
COM of Ad****, J i , Aoo a*™ of v.iuano* So ld f o r t h a t amount 
T^,I COM J infi Ann in 1983- f o r e c l o s e d i n 1990 
MII •«»»—»* 1 4 . 0 6 0 
Uthct l-icnk S Q, -
EMU.., t 8 1 , 0 0 0 
Monthly Amortization S nOO And to whom 
Ta*csJ 1 4 5 1 . 6 5 
Individual contribution* 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE \ 
I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct. si 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2&. day of J < ^ KXAO^M
 !9^_/ 
itarv Public residing in Suit L No y ake County. Utah 
My Commission Expires: ^ ° ' ' 
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION. INCLUDING 
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS. 3 MOST RECENT TAX 
RETURNS. CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS. PASSBOOKS. CHECKBOOKS. CANCELLED 
CHECKS. CERTIFICATES. POLICIES. AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
APPENDIX 4 
36 
In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
,-tf-j 
now snrnr TAYLOR 
P!amtiff 
vs. 
CHARLEEN TAILOR 
Defendant 
Husband: DON TAYLOR 
Address: 2598 V a l l e y View Ave. 
Casg No. qnAqOAQO? 'VIA 
Financial Declaration 
Dated: 1 0 / W < » 2 
Wife: 
Address: 
Soc. Sec. No.: 5 2 9 - 4 3 - 9 7 9 1 
Occupation: L e t t e r c a r r i e r 
Employer: U«S> P o s t a l S e r v i c e 
Birthdate: W - 3 7 
Soc. Sec No.; 
Occupation: _ 
Employer: 
Blrthdatcr. 
NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
FAILURE BY EITHERPAKITTO COMPLETE. PRESENT. AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL 
MJIHORIZE THE COURTTO ACCEPTTHE STATEMENT OFTHE OTHER PAKTYASTHE BASIS FOR 
AS DECISION. 
ANT FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR 
PEJUURYAlTOMATBEaDNSmEREDAFfUm^ 
STATEMENT OF. INCOME. EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
TROTS: lfc arrive at 
y*y Q^gflgtt—tt*pq*M mmW 
I Qnosa montniy income frotnr 
Salary and wages, including, cotniaa^tons, bonuses, 
altavmn^anfl overtime. o « v ^ mOHCOly 
period* 
sPenaiona and retirement. 
Social security 
l/isaDiilly and unemployment Insurance «»^llfc_ 
^ b * ^ assistance (wcuans, AFDC payments, etcj. 
Child support from any Parlor xnarriagr _ _ _ _ 
uiwscnaa and interest _ 
Rents 
AIL other sources: (Specify). 
TOTAL iMONTHLr INCOME. 
2w (temtxe monthly deduct Ions from qnxa income: 
.State and federal income taxes . 
Number of exemptions taken _^ 
Social sccuntr 
Medical or other insurance (describe fuiM
 t 
Union or.uther dues _ _ _ 
Retirement or pension fund . 
Savings plto 
,cp«y 
HUSBAND 
9 
2868.00 
— I F " 
3 
S2368.00 
604.00 
2.0,30 ; 
12 .84 
JiO.OO 
| WIFE | 
|4" 1 
3 
* 
Credit union 
Other: (specify) Jledicarfi 
70TAL MOl^ IWLY DEDUCTIONS ^ 
3. AfemoniWyinconw-toi^/^^P^ "• 
52ZZSI 
gT7T^5T84" 
5T^I7TT 
T 
4. Debts and obligations: 
Creditor's Name For Dace Payable Balance Monthly Payment 
*A&6xti Credit: \B^Qti ILoan-prapert:? taxes) 
Visa card ' 
Property taxes -LWl ' 
rgngu.uo i 360.00 
JLaflPiQQ 
2J5J3.QO 
i^i^M 
TtjTAL IS 
.121. nn 
4n nn 
(If insufficient space, inaer*total * n d attack schedule 
5. AU property of the pwtfei «*•*» *> weowort indMrfuattr or (otorW(mdi«wi^h«^orhoWtWeh«id:JH)Ht«bMK».(W)Wife| 
(J) Jonuiy). 
WHERE SPACS IS INSUFFICIENT TOR COMPLETS INFORM^ION OR USTING PLEASE KW* SEPARATE SCHEDULS. 
2&+l%a 
(a) Household furnishings, famuur*. 
appliances and equipment 
(M 
$ 
ZZSSSS1E£BSZ3SBCSSL 
-sua 
_on_ 
1500-00-
3 
fe) Secuiidw -socks . boo<** 
Bean Witter ^55ey Market grad" 
y i r a t l a v . — g A 
OTS '• - • = - ^ ^ 
• ' , * ' 
11 sj Qfltum 
# « * : t. ; j . 
WCaahand 0*paattAcca>fn|f 
SStt oaten* ~**vta»u\d Peking) 
:m •••-• "•" M ? i _ J £ 
acorn;cred i t pfllon v 
fj>oo.no. 
2^afifiLHfl. 
JJ25A-Q0L 
LL^ 
a loafav m* :::: :;!;-:;: fir;,. ^ ^ m 
3fiT nn j : i n on, 
W Ufc Insurance 
PbUcyNb. Face Amount 
Caah value, accumulated 
dividend, or loan amount 
Group Life InslzSsiSSal. 17,0(10 nn 
1 ;
. 3 _ ' 
— J O -
-.: i - s . 
J ; : : * !:*• J 
I) Profit shatln* or Retuetn*111 Account* 
tone -^ — 
*ame L—• 
..t •• Value of interest and amount presently vested 
•£ Other Personal Pttwpe*t* **« *???* \***«W , 
lAdtomotiv^ & machine too ls jinnn.nn 
, * ? -
(hi Real Estate Wheresw* than one pared of realeuace owned, attach sheet with idwiOcallnibrinaUon for aU additional proparti 
Big Cocconwood JCfanyon 
"Tots ZUb j» 2U/ 
Total Coat S * 
Mtft. Balances. 
otheruen»5 160.00 otmers dues 
Equity 3 _ 
Monthly A^ye^yofamtaaiiT-
Taxes $ L_ 
Inctlvtduai contributions 
TVp^ n^^ pgrrv Recreation 
Date of Acquisition 1973 
Total Present Value S 1 8 . 5 0 0 , 0 0 
Bast* of Valuation. _ Appraisal 
And to whom „ 
(0 auslneaa interest (indicate name, snare, type of bustneaa value less Indebtedness). 
Other aaaeta (Specify) 
'Toad mortihly expenses: -tSpeciiy which pany isttie custodial parent and list name and relationship of ail members of tlft 
&ottaetK>ki|wn<w; cxpq}aca arc indudedj: -
/ft*: * A. . 
i: !••• I ft 
*Jfcnt:or snortgaice lwymenta (residence}. 
7&al property taxes (reatdexicei:. 
it t - . h . 
M I *». * ;.•'* 
*1*eaf property tnsuranrc (restdencel^ 
^iMtgnMgaie'ffgaidgnggy '- • • ". 
: i . 
Fdod and household suppttea- - - * 
UUUtSe9ineitKltna:waier. deanctty, $uuindheai_ 
TViephone: _ : -; i a g ' ! ; ' {- " " 
Laundry and ctamnut-__^ 
Ctotliin*
 : 
Medical-
Dental - , 
Insurance (life, accident. cooiprehenaive (lability. dtsaoWtvf Eachjdc Payroll Deducted 
Child care . -
Payment of child spousal support re prior marriagem 
School- - - -
Kmertainmeru linriiutea. cHiba. sortai obtijBttJons. travel recrcarionl. 
Incidentals, (grooming. toUacco. alcohol, j&Uts, and.donailonsl > 
Ttanspocuukm (other Jhan automobile} _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Autoexperwe dttiH, oil?repair. Biaurancef L - L L J '' * 
Inutailmmi paymentbl. Unseti total and attach itemized schedule 
if not lultf set forth in (dlon thetlrst page hereon. 
Otherexpenses* (Insert total and spec*y on attached schedule! S P O U S a l 
Support. 
TOTAL EXPENSES 
{ i -HUSBAND 
400.00 
400.00 
-snro-
•37,00 
10.00 
were 
s 
75.83 
30,00 
20,00 
^47.00 
JtQCLQSL 
e 
JLfi24.fi .1 
Address: Potter Lane 
Heber,City, Utah 
Original cos t : $26,000.00 
Cost of Additions:1,000.00 
Total cost: $27,000.00 
Mtg. Balance 0 
Liens 0 
Equity (1/3) $7,263.00 
Type of Property: Agriculture 
JDkte of Acquisition : 1977 
Total present -value: $20,790.^0 
Address: 13757 South Redwood M. 
Riverton,:Utah 
Original c o s t : $105,000.00 
Cost: of Additions: 1,400.00 
Total cost: 
Mtx( balance 
Ljena 
Equity: 
Monthly Amor. 
Taxes (annually) 
106.400.00 
8*000.00 
0 
87.000.00 
360.00 
1431.65 
Type of property : Investment 
Date of Acquisition : 1984 
Total present value. $95,000100 
STATE OF UTAH | 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE I 
3 8 . 
^Q#r ^^A^-I swear that ihe matter* stated herein are true andxpirect. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this {_?<? day of O ^ T^fa^&T 1
 -Ox NOTARY PUBLIC DIANE S-JONES 
•MM? 
STATE OF OTAH 
Notary Public 
My Cormnission 
- . 19 TX. 
; in Salt Lake County. Utah 
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION. INCLUDING 
BUT NOT UMITED TO- PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS. 3 MOST RECENT TAK 
RETURNS. CREDITUNION SHARESTATEMENTS. PASSBOOKS. CHECKBOOKS. CANCELLED CHECKS. 
CERTIFICATES. POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
